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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(3)0').

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the 1976 Agreement is

illegal?
Standard of Appellate Review
Whether the 1976 agreement is illegal is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217,1220 (Utah 1995).
Issue Preserved in Trial Court
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 297, 1030, 1427-28 *.

H.

Whether the trial court erred in retroactively applying the Utah

Pyramid Scheme Act, Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq., to the 1976 Agreement?
Standard of Appellate Review
The retroactive application of statutes is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntvre Investment Co.. 956 P.2d 257,259 (Utah 1998).

l

A transcript of the May 18,1998 Oral Arguments before the Honorable Howard
H. Maetani, from which the Order being appealed resulted, is not a part of the appellate
record because the District Court personnel cannot locate the videotape from that date.
1

Issue Preserved in Trial Court
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 297,1030,1427-28.

HI.

Whether the trial court's application of the Utah Pyramid Scheme Act,

Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq., impairs the Plaintiffs/Appellant's contractual
rights under the July 31, 1976 agreement in violation of the contract clauses in
Article I, §10 of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution?
Standard of Appellate Review
Whether the statute impairs the Plaintiffs/Appellant's contract rights in violation
of the Contract Clause is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Trail
Mountain Coal v. Division of Lands. 921 P.2d 1365,1369-71 (Utah 1996).
Issue Preserved in Trial Court
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 297,1030,1427-28.

IV.

Whether the trial court erred in entering the Order denying

Plaintiffs/Appellant's motion for summary judgment on her breach of contract
cause of action?
Standard of Appellate Review
Appellate review for a summary judgment is one of correctness, with no deference
afforded to the trail court. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991).

2

Issue Preserved in Trial Court
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 194-303, 987-1051.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTE INVOLVED
Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4):
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person gives
consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive
compensation which is derived primarilyfromthe introduction of other persons into the
sales device or plan rather than from the sale of goods, services, or other property.

U.S. Constitution Article I, §10(1):
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.

Utah Constitution Article I, §18:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.

3

STATEMKINT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This matter comes before this Court pursuant to Janet Peterson's appeal of the
Order signed by the Honorable Jame: : • - a> w. r, I cdrSa u^c JLI u\ti^

, v u.; au^e, on

March 3u„ 200n, and entered DM March ) I .:iii)0.
This case arises out of a claim by Mrs. Peterson against Sunrider Corporation, d.b.a.
Sunrider International (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sunrider55), for breach of
contract and the covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and against Tei Fu Chen, the
current Chairman of Si inrider's Board

'

• -* :

• • ..: : >;u.- interference "\v ith a

contract.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

and Tei Fu Chen (hereinafter colleHv^

r *>- ? « v

-:

e-Vn^ms^ *v V : : r

answer on May 3, 1996. (R. 13-19). Mrs. Peterson subsequently filed an Amended
Complaint on September 11, 1996. (R 42-53). The Defendants filed an Answer To

filed an Answer To Counterclaim on October 9, 1996. (R 64- 66)
On January 15,1998, Mrs. Peterson file a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
on her breach of contract cause of action. (R. 194-303). On. April 1, 1998, Defendants

4

filed a Motion To Dismiss Mrs. Peterson's tortious interference with contract cause of
action, and a Motion For Summary Judgment on each of Mrs. Peterson's causes of action.
(R. 1166-67,1176-1359).
On May 18, 1998, the Honorable Howard H. Maetani held consolidated oral
arguments on Mrs. Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment, and the Defendants'
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as well as other nondispositive motions
filed by both Mrs. Peterson and the Defendants. (R. 1472). On June 15,1998, Judge
Maetani issued a Memorandum Decision granting Defendants' motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment, and denying Mrs. Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment.
(R. 1575-85). On October 6, 1998, Judge Maetani signed and entered an Order
memorializing his ruling in the June 15, 1998 Memorandum Decision. (R. 1613-16).
On October 14,1998, Mrs. Peterson filed a Notice Of Appeal with the trial court.
(R. 1620-21). On December 15, 1998, Chief Justice Howe signed an Order dismissing
Mrs. Peterson's appeal because the Order appealed from was ruled to be a nonfinal
judgment. (R. 1640). On January 21,2000, the Supreme Court issued a Remittur to the
trial court. (R. 1641).
On March 31,2000, the Honorable James R. Taylor entered an Order adopting the
findings and conclusions of fact and law in Judge Maetani's June 15,1998 Memorandum
Decision, granting Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and
denying Mrs. Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 1668-69). On April

5

19, 2000, Mrs. Peterson filed a Notice Of Appeal w Mi the trial coin t (R 1 590- 91)

Statement of Facts
1

NaturaLife International, Inc. wis n T_r-;^, v urporation which was

incorporated on May 27, !97f>, (R. 31)3, 62 am! I>X5;»,
lei Fii Chen acqi lired NaturaLife International, Iiic by entering into a Stock
Sale Agreement on September 24, 1982, with the sole stockholders of NaturaLife
International, Inc., Kenneth A. Murdock and George T. Murdock, Jr. fR. 202 6 • and
1585).
NiiloniLjfc ^ternatioir.iljnc.'snt'mcwnsrhanjjcil 1o Sunriiler (. orpoRition.
(R. 302, 255 and 1585). NaturaLife and Sunrider are hereinafter collectively refeixed to'
as the "Company."
4
1584).

Sunrider International is a ;!./
..•

.

n >...nnci::* Corporatior:. :\ 1 ~. i - and

.

The Company markets its products through a multi-level marketing sales
program. (R. 302, 60 and 1584).
6.

L. ^ i... ,J . . 'eterson, the now deceased spouse of Janet Peterson entered into

an agreement c:ce.c.'v Jv * "

*'*'*"-* -• :::- •* •

..;

- T .V *~ - '•*',"-!_

;

- - the

"Agreement") which made Sharon and John Famsworth (husband and wife) and their
sponsored organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Famsworth

6

Organization") first level distributors of the Company's products to Janet Peterson, as
though the Farnsworth Organization had been originally sponsored by Janet Peterson. (R.
301-02,287,250-52 and 1584).
7.

Pursuantto the Agreement, Mrs. Peterson remains a director of the Company

for the purpose of receiving override commissions from directors occurring in her
organization regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level. (R. 301,287,1050,
1006, and 1014-19).
8.

The Company currently calls the override commissions referred to in the

Agreement a "Leadership Development Bonus." (R. 301 and 244).
9.

The Agreement waived each and every requirement that existed at the time

the Agreement was entered into for Mrs. Peterson being a director with the Company for
the purpose of receiving override commission/Leadership Development Bonus from
directors occurring in her organization. (R. 301, 1050,1006, and 1014-19).
10.

The override commission/Leadership Development Bonus pays a director

of the Company a monthly amount that is a percentage of product sales made by the
director's organization. (R. 300 and 1013).
11. The scheduled rate for calculating the override commission/Leadership
Development Bonus is contained in the Company's Policy Guides or Business Guides.
(R. 1013).

7

12.

' riie reason the Companyr agreed to enter into the Agreement in the first place

was because if the company did not pay the override commission/Leadership Development
Bonus to Mrs. Peterson as called for in the Agreement, the monies wculd stay with the
Company. (R. 1012).
13.

r

i"iai? an: 17 dili'ercnt levels ofjchievemenL under vJndi the ('umpany's

distributors may earn various forms of compensate • ,
1 4.

; - ' ; : "'* vv' " *).

Mi s. Peterson received her monthly override commission/Leadership

Development Bonus payment from the Company, from the time the Agreement was
executed until December oi I','94. (k. 299, 224 and 24^-43).
11>

Ifv

Heivm1 --

f

ri'U,

Mrs

IVUT'MHVS

monthly iivernde

commission/Leadership Development Bonus averaged approximately $3,500.00 per
month. (R. 299 and 249).
. . . M diii . : decision made by the Compaii} \s runer.t i rcsiaci, , L -Lin
Chen, **- \ K' r ~«r \*- --. yr -M-< ... -*.y> \:.-< v- • o
l.~.

%

>>l\ !_Vv*-*

Mr J. Peterson has net Signed any writing which purports to modify the

Agreement, and there has been no conversation between Mrs. Peterson and anyone from
the Company vv liicii purported to modify the Agreement, (iv. J, Kj and 239-40).

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in entering the March 31,2000 Order granting the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that the Agreement was for an illegal
purpose, and based its ruling on the definition of a "pyramid scheme" found in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6a-2(4) which was adopted in 1983. The trial court wrongly interpreted the
definition of a "pyramid scheme" in Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against the facts of this
case.
Even if the trial court correctly interpreted the definition of a "pyramid scheme" in
Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against the facts of this case, the trial court erred in
retroactively applying a statute that was enacted in 1983 to the Agreement which was
entered into in 1976.
Even if the trial correctly interpreted the definition of a "pyramid scheme" in Utah
Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against the facts of this case, and did npt wrongfully apply Utah
Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) retroactively in this case, the trial court wrongfully impaired Mrs.
Peterson's contractrightsthat were in existence immediately prior to enactment of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) in violation of the contract clause in both Article I, § 10 of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution.
Finally, the trial court erred in entering the March 31, 2000 Order denying Mrs.
Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment on her breach of contract cause of action

9

because there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and she is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law on that issue.

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred in finding that the 1976 Agreement is illegal.

In ruling on Mrs. Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment, and the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court in its June 15, 1998
Memorandum Decision ruled that the Agreement is for an illegal purpose, and summarily
dismissed Mrs. Peterson's breach of contract claim against the Defendants. In doing so,
the trial court based its ruling on the definition of a pyramid sales scheme found in Utah
Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) which was adopted in 1983. Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4)
provides:
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a person
gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the
right to receive compensation which is derived primarily from the
introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than from
the sale of goods, services, or other property.
The trial court has wrongly interpreted the definition of a "pyramid scheme" in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against the facts of this case.
To find that the Agreement violates Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4), the evidence
would have to show that the override commission/Leadership Development Bonus called

10

for by the Agreement is derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the
Company rather than from the sale of goods. No such evidence exists.
The evidence shows that Mrs. Peterson's override commission/Leadership
Development Bonus was based solely upon the product sales
made by the Famsworth Organization, and had nothing to do with, and was not contingent
upon, the introduction of new persons into the Famsworth Organization. In fact, the
evidence is silent as to whether or not any person in the Famsworth Organization was
introduced or sponsored into the Famsworth Organization subsequent to the Agreement
being entered into in 1976.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-L et seq., is a part of Utah's Criminal Code, and was
enacted by the legislature to guard against programs that create compensation derived
primarily from introducing others into the sales plan. Virginia has enacted a similar
statute, as have many states. The Virginia Supreme Court made clear the legislative
purpose of these types of statutes in its decision in the case of Bell v. Commonwealth. 236
Va. 298, 303, 374 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1988) where it stated:
As the number in the chain of participants expands and the market for
new recruits declines, the law of diminishing returns begins to operate
against the interests of those who become participants late in the process.
Once the market is exhausted, no participant...has an opportunity to receive
compensation...in return for inducing other persons to become participants
in the program.
The override commission/Leadership Development Bonus called for in the Agreement
does not operate against the interest of the persons in the Famsworth Organization because
11

any override commission/Leadership Development Bonus not paid to Mrs. Peterson stays
in the Company. Additionally, there are 17 different levels of achievement under which
the persons in the Farnsworth Organization may earn various forms of compensation,
which shows that each person within the Farnsworth Organization has the opportunity to
receive compensation, despite when that person joins the organization. There is no
evidence that other persons in the Farnsworth Organization complained about the
Agreement, or were adversely affected by the Agreement.
The evidence in this case does not support the trial court's ruling that the
Agreement is for an illegal purpose. The trial court erred in finding that the 1976
Agreement was illegal, and should be reversed.

IL

The trial Court erred in retroactively applying the Utah Pyramid
Scheme Act, Utah Code Ann, §76-6a-l et seq., to the 1976
Agreement.

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 provides, "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." This statutory provision is merely a statement of well settled
rules of statutory construction. Farrel v. Pingree. 5 Utah 443, 448,16 P. 843, (1888).
In dismissing Mrs. Peterson's breach of contract claim against the Defendants, the
trial court based its ruling on the definition of a pyramid sales scheme found in Utah Code
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Ann. §76-6a-2(4). In doing so, the trial court wrongfully retroactively applied a statute
that was enacted in 1983 to the Agreement which was entered into in 1976.
Even if this Court were tofindthat the trial court correctly inteipreted the definition
of a "pyramid scheme" in Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against the facts of this case, the
legality of the Agreement must be determined by the law in force at the time of its
execution. Cache County v. Property Tax Div. Of Utah State Tax Common.. 922 P.2d 758.
766 (Utah 1996).
Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4), or any similar statutory provision, did not exist at the
time the Agreement was entered into. Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq. makes no express
statement that the chapter is to have retroactive effect. As a result, the Agreement is legal
and enforceable. The trial court's finding that the Agreement is for an illegal purpose and
void, is error and should be reversed.

III.

The trial court's application of the Utah Pyramid Scheme Act,
Utah

Code

Ann.

§76-6a-l

et

seq.,

impairs

the

Plaintiffs/Appellant's contractual rights under the July 31,1976
agreement in violation of the contract clauses in Article I, §10 of
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution.
The contract clause of both Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 18
of the Utah Constitution, prohibits the State of Utah from enacting any law that impairs
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a person's contract rights. The prohibition contained in both the federal and state
constitution protects contractual obligations in existence at the time the disputed legislation
is enacted, and relates only to legislative action, not to judicial decisions. George v. Oren
Ltd. & Assoc, 672 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 1983).
In dismissing Mrs. Peterson's breach of contract claim against the Defendants, the
trial court based its ruling on the definition of a pyramid sales scheme found in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6a-2(4). In doing so, the trial court wrongfully applied a statute that was enacted
in 1983, to impair Mrs. Peterson's contract rights that existed since the Agreement was
entered into in 1976. The trial court's ruling violates both Article I, §10 of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, §18 of the Utah Constitution.
Over the years, courts have carved out an exception to the general prohibitions
contained in the contract clause of federal and state constitutions. This exception was
defined in this Court's opinion in George.
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police power, a state can enact
regulations or laws reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
comfort or general welfare of the community regardless of whether such
laws or regulations affect contracts incidentally, directly or indirectly.
George, 672 P.2d at 737. A brief summary of Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq. is in order
to show that such an exception is not applicable in the present case.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq. states any person who knowingly organizes,
establishes, promotes, or administers a pyramid scheme is guilty of a third degree felony,
and further provides that a criminal conviction under the chapter is prima facie evidence
14

of a violation of Utah Code Ann. §13-11-4, the Utah Consumer Practices Act. The
Chapter also provides a civil remedy for persons who have become involved in an illegal
pyramid scheme to recover the consideration paid by that person.
Even if Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-l et seq. is a proper exercise by the state of its
police power, there is no evidence to suggest that Mrs. Peterson's Agreement with the
Company jeopardized the health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare of the
community. Accordingly, even if this Court were to find that the trial court correctly
interpreted the definition of a "pyramid scheme" in Utah Code Ann. §76-6a-2(4) against
the facts of this case, and finds that the trial court did not wrongfully apply Utah Code
Ann. §76-6a-2(4) retroactively in this case, the trial court may not impair Mrs. Peterson's
contract rights that were in existence immediately prior to enactment of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6a-2(4). The trial court's summary dismissal of Mrs. Peterson's breach of contract
claim against the Defendants, was error, and should be reversed.

IV.

The trial court erred in entering the Order denying
Plaintiffs/Appellant's motion for summary judgment on her
breach of contract cause of action?

UtR. CivP. 56provides that summaryjudgment "shall be rendered if thepleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

15

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In the present case, Mrs. Peterson is entitled
to summary judgment on her breach of contract cause of action.

The Agreement Is A Valid, Enforceable Contract.
The elements of valid, enforceable contract are: 1) proper subject matter; 2)
competent parties; 3) offer; 4) acceptance; and 5) consideration. Neiderhauser Builders
and Development Corp.. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193,1197-98 (Utah App. 1992). The
Agreement is the outward manifestation of a legitimate business agreement between two
competent parties. The Agreement involves a subj ect matter that was proper for these two
parties to be entering into contracts over. The Agreement manifests an offer by Lloyd D.
Peterson, the now deceased spouse of Janet Peterson, to make the Famsworth Organization
first level distributors of the Company's products to Janet Peterson, as though the
Famsworth Organization had been originally sponsored by Janet Peterson. Lloyd
Peterson's offer was accepted by the Company. Valid consideration was paid to the
* Company by Lloyd Peterson. The Agreement satisfies each of the elements of a contract,
and because the Company now refuses to pay any sums called for by the Agreement to
Mrs. Peterson, Mrs. Peterson's cause of action for breach of contract should be granted by
summary judgment.

16

The Agreement Has Not Been Modified.
i.

Modification Requires A Meeting Of The Minds. Additional Consideration.
And A Writing Sufficient To Satisfy The Statute Of Frauds.

A condition precedent to enforcement of a modified contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness. Fishery. Fisher. 907 P.2d 1172,1177 (Utah App.
1995). By its own admission, the company has never spoken to Mrs. Peterson concerning
a modification to the Agreement, and has no document executed or signed by Mrs.
Peterson which would manifest her understanding of, or agreement to, a modification of
any of the terms of the Agreement. Clearly there has been no meeting of the minds
concerning any modification of the Agreement, therefore Mrs. Peterson could not have
expressly or impliedly agreed to, or acquiesced in, any modification of the Agreement.
Even if there had been a meeting of the minds concerning a modification of the
Agreement, when a contract is modified, there must be additional consideration for such
modification. Wilson v Gardner. 10 Utah 2d 89,91,348 P.2d 931 (1960). Mrs. Peterson
received her monthly override commission/Leadership Development Bonus payment from
the Company, from the time the Agreement became effective, July 31, 1976, until
December of 1994. These payments are the payments called for by the Agreement, to
which Mrs. Peterson is entitled to under the Agreement. Mrs. Peterson has received
nothingfromthe Defendants that she was not already entitled to, and certainly nothing that
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would constitute additional consideration in support of an alleged modification of the
Agreement. Because there has been no additional consideration, the Agreement could not
have been modified.
Even if there had been a meeting of the minds regarding a modification to the
Agreement, and Mrs. Peterson had received additional consideration which would support
a modification of the Agreement, the Agreement could not have been modified because
the statute of frauds requires the modification to be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged by the modification. This Court explained this when it held that if the original
contract is within the statue offrauds,any modification of that contract must also comply
with the statute of frauds. Fisher. 907 P.2d at 1176. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds the
Agreement was required to be in writing inasmuch as the agreement could not be
completed in one year's time. See Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4(1). Thus any modification to
the Agreement would also require a writing that will satisfy the statute of frauds. No such
writing exists, so the Agreement could not have been modified.

ii.

The Policy Guides Or Business Guides Alone Could Not Modify the
Agreement.

In the years since the Agreement was entered into, the Company has published
Policy Guides and Business Guides which contain the elements of the Company's multilevel marketing program. In general, the Policy Guides and Business Guides contained

18

new programs and "opportunities" for the Company's distributors, and also imposed some
additional requirements on the Company's distributors. For example, in the March, 1993,
version of the Company's Business Guide there appeared for the first time additional
requirements for being a Sales Leader, which were that Sales Leaders hold periodic sales
meetings and maintain frequent mail contact with distributors downline from the Sales
Leader.
Before Oi-Lin Chen made the decision to stop paying Mrs. Peterson her monthly
override commission/Leadership Development Bonus payments, no person from the
Company ever told Mrs. Peterson that the monthly override commission/Leadership
Development Bonus payments called for by the Agreement were, in the Company's
opinion, contingent upon Mrs. Peterson complying with the new requirements of the
Business Guides. Such an instruction, if given, would have breached the Agreement, and
would have been contrary to the course of dealings between the parties which had
honored the payments required by the Agreement for over 18 years.
It is clearfromthe evidence that Mrs. Peterson was not required to do anything to
remain a Director in the Company for the puiposes of receiving override
commission/Leadership Development Bonus payments. Since there was no meeting of the
minds between Mrs. Peterson and the Defendants concerning the alleged new
requirements, and because Mrs. Peterson received no additional consideration in return for
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agreeing to the alleged new requirements, the Company's Policy Guides or Business
Guides alone could not have modified the Agreement.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons and analysis, Mrs. Peterson respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court's March 31,2000 Order granting summary judgment
in favor of the Defendants, and denying partial summary judgment in her favor on her
breach of contract cause of action.
DATED this 23Id day of October, 2000.
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC

Thomas W. Seiler
Jared L. Anderson
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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ADDENDUM
1.
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2.

June 15,1998 Memorandum Decision

3.

March 31,2000 Order

Addendum 1
1976 Agreement

I, Lloyd 0. Peterson, do hereby offer to purchase from NaturaLife
International the NaturaLife Distributors known as Sharon and John
Farnsworth (husband and wife) and their sponsored organization far the
sum of SI500 (one thousand five hundred dollars). This amount will be
reduced by NaturaLife International from salary due me- It is understood that t h i s purchase will become effective at 11:53 p.m. on July 31,
1975, and frGm that time on, the above Farnsworth NaturaLife organization will become f i r s t level distributors or directors as the case may
be to my wife, Janet S. Peterson- It is also specified that my wife,
Janet Peterson, will remain a director with tine company for the purpose
of receiving overrides from directors occuring to her organization
regardless of her personal purchase volume (PV) level. I do understand,
however, that her personal group PV for those below director level will be paid
at the scheduled rate for the PV level reached each month.

'-"I

Lloyd 0. Peterson

The NaturaLife International company accepts the offer of Lloyd D.
Peterson for the purchase of the sponsorship of John and Sharon Farnsworth
and their sponsored organization as distributors and/or directors as
though they had been originally directly sponsored by Janet S. Peterson.
The purchase price and terms are approved as written in the proposal.

T^Zfcut*^*,^—
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Addendum 2
June 15, 1998 Memorandum Decision

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court of

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CARMJJ B^S^H^terk'
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
f lA^V/W\
'
, Deputy

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JANET PETERSON,
Plaintiff;

CASE NO. 960400174
DATE: JUNE 15,1998

vs.

JUDGE: HOWARD H.MAETANI
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRJDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEIFU CHEN,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court
Judge. Plaintifffileda Motion to Amend, a Motion to Name an Expert Witness, a Motion to
Strike Affidavits, a Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, and a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Defendantfileda Motion to Compell Discovery, and a Motion for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss. The Court heard oral arguments on these motions on May
18, 1998.
Having reviewed thefiled,memoranda and exhibits submitted by both parties, heard
oral arguments and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

NaturaLife International, Inc. was a Utah Corporation which was incorporated

on May 27, 1976.
2.

The Defendant Tei Fu Chen acquired NaturaLife International, Inc. by

entereing into a Stock Sale Agreement on September 24,1982, with the sole stockholders of
NaturaLife International, Inc., Kenneth A. Murdock and George T. Murdock, Jr.
3.

NaturaLife International, Inc.'s name was changed to Sunrider Corporation.
1

4.

Sunrider International is a dba of Sunrider Corporation. The same are

collectively referred to herein as "Sunrider."
5.

Defendant Sunrider markets its products through a multi-level marketing sales

6.

On July 31, 1976, Lloyd D. Peterson, the deceased spouse of the Plaintiff,

program.

purchased from NaturaLife International, Inc., for and on behalf of the Plaintiff Mrs. Peterson, the
NaturaLife distributors known as Sharon and John Famsworth (husband and wife), and thensponsored organization.
7.

Pursuant to a decision made by Oi-Lin Chen, President of Sunrider, the

Defendant Sunrider refuses to pay any sums to Mrs. Peterson.
8.

On May 3,1995, a letter was sent to Sunrider by Mrs. Peterson's counsel by

which Mrs. Peterson demanded payment from Sunrider for all past, present, and future amounts
due and owing her under the 1976 purchase document executed by her deceased husband.
9.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Sunrider on March 19, 1996.

10.

Defendant filed an Answer on May 3, 1996.

11.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 11, 1996.

12.

Defendant filed an Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, October

13.

Plaintiff filed an Answer to Counterclaim, October 9, 1996.

14.

Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum for Partial Summary Judgment,

8, 1996.

January 15, 1998.
15.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment and

Request for Hearing, February 3, 1998.
16.

Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary

Judgment, February 6, 1998.
17.

Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum toAmend their Complaint, February

18.

Plaintiff filed a Motion and Memorandum to Name an Expert Witness,

10, 1998.

February 12, 1998.
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19.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Amend, February 25,1998.

20.

Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Name an Expert Witness,

March 4, 1998.
21.

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment and to

Dismiss, April 1,1998.
22.

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Compell Discovery, April 3,

23.

Plaintifffileda Motion to Strike and a Memorandum in Opposition to

1998.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss, April 16, 1998.
24.

Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss,

and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, April 23, 1998.

n
ISSUES
Plaintiff argues that Sunrider has breached the Contract entered into by Plaintiffs
deceased husband on her behalf by refusing to pay "commissions" on the products sold by
distributors on her "down-line." Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the
requirements of a director andfirst-leveldistributor, as defined in Sunrider's Business Records,
that are in addition to her personal purchase volume.

m
ANALYSIS
MOTION TO AMEND
The Court has broad discretion in granting leave to amend. Courts have liberally
construed Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) to "further the interest ofjustice" and to allow parties to have
their claimsfollyadjudicated. Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 R2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). In the
interest ofjudicial economy and having Plaintiffs claimfollyadjudicated, the Court grants
Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff can add Oi Lin Chen as a defendant. Plaintiffcan clarify that
"Sunrider International" is the new name of "NaturaLife International." Plaintiffcan change a
typographical error in the payment termination datefromDecember 1995 to December 1994.
Defendant will be granted a fair opportunity to respond to the amended pleadings.
3

MOTION TO NAME AN EXPERT WITNESS
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to name an expert witness for the purpose of
calculating damages. Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence . . . a witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto .. .." Clarifying the Bonus
Recap Reports and other damage issues will assist the trier of fact in determining the appropriate
remedy if it is found there has been a breach of contract. The expert witness will be particularly
useful if the 1978 business guide is found to be the correct guide for calculating damages.
Defendant has adequate time to prepare for adjudication of this issue.
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS
The Court denies Plaintiffs motion to strike the affidavits of Sharon Farasworth,
Robert Katchen, and Ras Jeyakumar. Although the affidavits may have beenfileda few days late,
because the Court is allowing Plaintiff to add a new party and name an expert witness, to be fair,
the Court will not strike these three affidavits submitted by the Defendant. Plaintiff has adequate
time to prepare for adjudication of any issues relating to these three affidavits.
MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
The Court denies Plaintiffs motion to strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion.
The Mailing certificate indicates that Defendant's motion was mailed timely on March 31, 1998.
^Because this motion could be served by mail, service was deemed complete upon mailing. Utah
R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1).
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
The Court grants Defendant's motion to compel discovery. Once again, the Court
wants to be fair. Although Defendant's interrogatories may have been broader than anticipated,
because the Court is allowing Plaintiff to add a new party and call an expert witness after the
discovery deadline, the Court will order Plaintiff to answer Defendant's interrogatories in a
manner that is not evasive or incomplete.
4

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY 3UDGMEKT
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a) and (b), a party against whom a
claim has been made, may at any time move for a summary judgment in his favor. The motion
should be granted if".. .the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP Rule 56C.
The Court denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff asks the
Court to grant a partial summary judgment on herfirstcause of action—breach of contract.
Summary judgment is appropriate if Plaintiff can show no genuine issue of material facts and that
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after allowing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the Defendant. Estate of Covington v. JosephsoiL 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In addition, u[o]nly when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be
interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary judgment." Webb v. RO. A. General Inc., 804
P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Colonial Leasing Cn v, Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986)). The Court cannot summarily determine there has been a breach of contract
because the terms of the contract are unclear and ambiguous.
Plaintiff contends that the 1976 writing is a valid contract because it meets the elements
of proper subject matter, competent parties, offer, acceptance, and consideration. The 1976
writing may meet these requirements, however, both parties look beyond the 1976 writing to
different business guides to determine payments and other contract terms. Obviously, the 1976
writing is not a completely integrated contract. There are at least two questions of material fact in
dispute. First, the parties dispute which business guide should be used to supplement the 1976
writing. Second, the parties dispute whether the 1976 writing waives all Director requirements or
only the requirement of personal purchase volume. Both of these facts are necessary to determine
whether there has been a breach of contract.
There is a question of material fact as to which business guide should be used. Plaintiff
argues that the 1978 business guide should be used because the payment schedule listed in the
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1978 business guide is the same payment schedule that existed in 1976 when the 1976 writing was
drafted. Defendant argues, relying upon Plaintiffs own testimony, that the current business guide
should be used because even Plaintiff acknowledged that Sunrider could change its business guide
unilaterally when things were not quite right. Based upon Plaintiffs testimony, it is a reasonable
inference that each new business guide combines with the 1976 writing to form an integrated
contract, or alternatively, each new business guide modifies the 1976 writing. Determining
whether to use the 1978 or the most current business guide is unclear, and therefore is a question
of fact to be decided by a fact-finder.
There is a question of material fact as to whether the 1976 writing waives all Director
requirements or only the requirement of personal purchase volume. Plaintiff relies on the extrinsic
evidence of Ken Murdock, one of the original parties to the contract, to show that the intent of
the parties was to keep Plaintiff a Director regardless of any requirements listed in the business
guides. Defendant argues that the face of the 1976 only waives the personal purchase volume
requirement, not any other Director requirement. It is ambiguous whether the 1976 writing
waives all Director requirements or only the requirement of personal purchase volume, and
therefore is a question of fact to be determined by a fact-finder. Also, when contract
interpretation must be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question of fact.
Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Plaintiff argues that none of the business guides could legally modify the 1976 writing
because Plaintiff never agreed to the terms of the business guides, Plaintiff never received any
additional consideration, and Plaintiff never signed any of the business guides. This argument
puzzles the Court. Plaintiff wants the Court to treat the business guides as being non-binding but
at the same time allow Plaintiff to rely on the 1978 business guide to calculate damages. If
Plaintiff can rely on the 1978 business guide to show the payment schedule of the 1976 writing,
based upon Plaintiffs own testimony and the face of the 1976 writing, it is not an unreasonable
inference that the business guides may also contain additional requirements to the 1976 writing.
The Court cannot summarily decide there has been a breach of contract because the
contract is unclear and ambiguous.

6
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DEFEM)ANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND TO DISMISS
Intentional interference with contractual relations
The Court grants Defendants motion to summarily dismiss the claim of intentional
interference with contractual relations.
Plaintiff relies on thefiveelements of intentional interference with contractual relations
listed in Model Utah Jury Instructions (MUJI). However, the case law requires more than the five
elements listed in MUJI. In Soterv. Wasatch Dev. Corp.. 443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968), a case that
both parties cite, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]n order to establish a right to recover on
such a cause of action the plaintiffs would have to show that the defendants, without justification,
by some wrongful and malicious act, interfered with the plaintiffs' right of contract, and that
actual damage resulted." I& at 664. Also, because Tei Fu Chen is the president of Sunrider, to
meet the requirement of "contract of another," Plaintiff must show that Tei Fu Chen "acted
beyond the scope of his powers or against the interests of the corporation," Stratton v. West
States Construction. 440P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1968).
Plaintiff argues that Tei Fu Chen acted maliciously and outside the scope of his powers
as a Sunrider officer because he entered into discussions with various Sunrider employees for the
puipose of terminating payments to Plaintiff However, Plaintiff offers nothing to explain why
discussing payment termination with various employees was malicious, outside the scope of
Defendant's powers, or against the interests of Sunrider. In fact, the undisputed evidence
indicates that Sunrider acted justifiably in terminating Plaintiffs payments because Plaintiff was
failing to qualify, Plaintiff was failing to work or train her down line, Plaintiffs inaction prejudiced
other qualifying participants, and Sunrider wanted to comply with the law. Sunrider had nothing
to gain by stopping Plaintiffs payments. Even Plaintiff testified that Sunrider would have to pay
out the same percentage amount regardless of whether Plaintiff was paid. Plaintiff started to
testify that Sunrider may benefit because some of its "big people" would get more money but then
retracted the statement. (See page 153-156 of the Deposition of Janet Peterson).
There are no material facts in dispute on this issue, and Defendant is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law. The Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss the claim of
intentional interference with contractual relations.

Breach of contract against Tei f y Chen
The Court grants Defendant's motion to summarily dismiss the breach of contract
against Tei Fu Chen.
"As a general rule, stockholders of a corporation are not liable, as such, for any
obligations of the corporation, regardless of how they were incurred." Parker v. Telegift
International, Inc.T 505 P.2d 301, 302 (Utah 1973) (citing 19 Am.Jur.2d, Coirporations § 713). In
fact, the president and major stockholders of a corporation cannot be liable for breach of contract
unless they "acted beyond the scope of [their] powers or against the interests of the corporation."
StIlttQnatll8.
Plaintiff argues that Tei Fu Chen became personally responsible for all obligations of
NaturaLife, including the contract with Plaintiff, because he became the only shareholder.
However, Plaintiff offers no facts or law to base this conclusion on. Just because Tei Fu Chen is
the sole shareholder does not necessarily make him personally liable for the 1976 writing. It is
also important to note that there are no facts indicating that Tei Fu Chen acted beyond his power,
or against the interest of Sunrider (See the "intentional interference with contractual relations"
section above).
There are no facts in dispute on this issue because Plaintiff has offered no evidence
showing that Tei Fu Chen personally assumed liability for the 1976 writing, or that Tei Fu Chen
acted outside the scope of his power. Because there are no material facts in dispute, and
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must summarily dismiss the
personal liability claim against Tei Fu Chen.

Punitive damage?
The Court grants Defendant's motion to summarily dismiss Plaintiff's claim of punitive
damages.
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Punitive damages may be awarded if there is "clear and convincing evidence that the
acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the
rights of others." Utah Code 78-18-1. Malice can be impliedfromunjustifiable conduct. Branch
v. Western Petroleum, Tnc. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff claims punitive damages against Tei Fu Chen. However, as noted above, there
is no evidence showing any unjustifiable conduct, malice, or reckless indifference. The undisputed
evidence indicates that Sunrider stopped payments because Plaintiff was not working and because
Sunrider wanted to comply with the law. Because the tort claim of intentional interference
against Tei Fu Chen has been dismissed, the prayer for punitive damages against Tei Fu Chen will
also be summarily dismissed.
Plaintiff also claims punitive damages against Sunrider. Plaintiff argues that Sunrider
violated its contractual duty of good faith and fair dealings. However, punitive damages are not
available for a breach of contract. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983).
Punitive damages are only available if "the breach of contract amounts to an independent tort.
Jorgensen at 232. There is no tort claim against Sunrider. Therefore, the Court must summarily
dismiss the claim of punitive damages against Sunrider.
Breach of contract against Sunrider
The Court grants Defendants motion to summarily dismiss the breach of contract claim
^gainst Sunrider.
Defendant argues that they are entitled to summary judgment because the language of
the 1976 writing is plain, because Plaintiff accepted modifications, and because Plaintiff does not
present sufficient evidence to show damages. However, as noted above in Plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment, there are material facts in dispute that must be determined by a factfinder regarding the 1976 writing, modification, and plain language. However, the Court does
grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the contract being illegal.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff claims she is entitled to a leadership bonus based solely on
her sponsorship of the Farnsworth organization. Plaintiffs husband purchased the Farnsworth
9

organization for $1,500. In return, Plaintiflf was to receive approximately $42,000 per year, for an
infinite period of time. Plaintiff admits that she has no obligation to promote or sell a product,
and no obligation to train or supervise down-line distributors. In fact, Plaintiff claims she is
entitled to a leadership bonus without any obligation at all.
The Court holds as a matter of law that receiving bonuses in a multi-marketing business
is illegal when the bonuses are based only upon sponsorship of an organization, rather than upon
promoting a product, selling a product, or training and supervising down-line distributors. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4) defines a pyramid scheme as "any sales device or plan under which a
person gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive
compensation which is derived primarilyfromthe introduction of other persons into the sales
device or plan rather thanfromthe sale of goods, services, or other property " It seems clear that
Plaintiflf is receiving compensation derived primarilyfromthe work of other people who were
introduced into the Farnsworth organization. Plaintiflf is expecting a bonus without selling any
goods, services, or other property.
The Court realizes that Plaintiflf is not recruiting people into the Farnsworth
organization. What troubles the Court is that Sunrider has adopted certain requirements in recent
years to comply with anti-pyramid laws, and Plaintiflf claims that these requirements do not apply
to her. The Court disagrees.
The Federal Trade Commission stated that to prevent a pyramid scheme, the safeguards
and requirements of a multi level marketing business must "serve to prevent inventory loading and
encourage retailing. In Re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 716 (1979). One requirement that the
F.T.C. found to be important was requiring each participant to submit proof of retail sales; this
rule "makes retail selling an essential part of being a distributor. In Re Amway Corp. at 716.
This case presents a unique situation. The anti-pyramid requirements of Sunrider seem
to encourage sales, and prevent focusing onfindingnew recruits. This is exactly what antipyramid laws require. Plaintiflf argues that her contract is not illegal because her bonus is based
on sales, not recruits. Then, Plaintiflf states that she does not have to comply with the new antipyramid requirements of Sunrider. It seems that Plaintiflf is gaining the benefits of Sunrider's antipyramid requirements while refusing to comply with the requirements herself. Although Sunrider
10
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may not be operating a pyramid scheme, until Plaintiff complies with Sunrider's anti-pyramid
requirements, Plaintiffs contract is for an illegal purpose. At the very least, Plaintiff must make
some retail sales to qualify to receive leadership bonuses.
The Court cannot enforce an illegal contract, therefore, the Court summarily dismisses
Plaintiffs claims.
IV
DECISION
For the reasons discussed above:
1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Amend.
2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Name an Expert Witness.
3. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavits.
4. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion.
5. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
6. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Compell Discovery.
7. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss.
Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare an Order consistent with the decision of this Court
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval.
DATED at Provo, t h i ^ d a y o § ^ ^ V ^ 9 8 .

o*22SL*,

HOWARD BErM^JETANI
Fourth District Court Judge
cc:

Thomas W. Seiler
H. Thomas Stevenson
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Addendum 3
March 31,2000 Order

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

- Q . S / - ^ ^

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Janet Peterson,

:

Plaintiff

:

ORDER

vs.

:

Date: March 30,2000

The Sunrider Corporation, d.b.a.
Sunrider International, and Tei Fu Chen

:

Case Number: 960400174

Defendant

:

Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

This matter comes before the Court for execution of a "clarifying order" authorized by
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. during a pre-trial scheduling conference held on April 11, 1999. Both
counsel have submitted proposed orders, each arguing that their opponent's order is either
inadequate or improper. In addition to reviewing the pleadings in thisfile,this Court has
reviewed the tape record of the April 11,1999 hearing, conferred with Judge Harding, Sr. (who
has no independent recollection of the matter) and reviewed the Memorandum Decision of Judge
^Maetani dated June 15, 1998. Being advised in the premises, this Court therefore ORDERS:
Findings and conclusions of fact and law as stated and/or made implicit in the
Memorandum Decision of Judge Maetani on June 15, 1998 are adopted herein as thefindingsof
this Court.
The matters at issue in this case are fully and completely resolved by thefindingsand
ruling of Judge Maetani and this order Under the heading "Decision" in the Memorandum
Decision, Judge Maetani made 7 specific rulings. Numbers 1, 2, 3 and 6 were rendered moot by
Page 1 of
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the conclusions of numbers 4, 5 and 7. In addition, Judge Harding, Sr., on April 11,1999, denied
the Defendants' motion for sanctions. Although this Court does not intend to disturb or in any
way contradict the decision of Judge Maetani, for the purposes of this clarifying order:
1) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants Summary Judgment Motion is denied.
2) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
3) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss is granted as to each claim
raised by the Plaintiffs most recently amended complaint.
4) Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed.
5) Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied without prejudice to renewing the motion if
this matter is remanded for further proceedings following^a™^-;^^^^Dated this 30* day of March, 2 q P V ^

A certificate of mailing is on the following page
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Peterson v. Sunrider, 960400174: Order of March 30,2000.
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Thomas W.Seiler
Jared L. Anderson
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, L.C.
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Counsel for the Defendants:
H Thomas Stevenson
Brad C. Smith
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Mailed this J V

day of / A^iA-^OOO, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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